Happiness and International Migration by Polgreen, Linnea & Simpson, Nicole B
 1
 
 
 
 
 
Happiness and International Migration 
 
 
 
 
Linnea Polgreen  
University of Iowa 
College of Pharmacy 
115 S. Grand Ave.  
Iowa City, IA  52242 
linnea-polgreen@uiowa.edu 
Phone: 319-384-3024   
Fax: 319-353-5646 
Nicole B. Simpson∗ 
Colgate University 
Department of Economics 
13 Oak Dr. 
Hamilton, NY 13346 
nsimpson@colgate.edu 
Phone: 315-288-7991 
Fax: 315-228-7033 
 
 
September 2010 
 
  
Abstract 
In this paper, we consider the extent to which the aggregate happiness of a country affects the 
flow of people across its borders.  We merge data from the World Values Survey, which 
produces happiness indices for 84 countries between 1981 and 2004, with three different 
migration datasets.  We find that happiness has a U-shaped relationship with emigration rates: 
emigration rates fall in happiness for relatively unhappy countries, but rise for relatively happy 
countries.  The U-shaped relationship also holds for migrant flows into the U.S.  When analyzing 
net migration rates, we find that the reverse relationship exists.  Net migration is associated with 
an increase in happiness for relatively unhappy countries, but after a threshold level of happiness, 
net migration is associated with a decrease in happiness.  Our findings are robust to various 
empirical specifications and datasets.      
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Introduction 
 
In the last half century, international migration has increased worldwide, despite increased efforts by 
many governments to limit immigration.1  In 2005, approximately 191 million people lived outside their place of 
birth, representing 3 percent of the world population,2  compared to 75 million in 1960 (2.5% of the world 
population at that time).  In this paper, we consider the extent to which the movement of people across borders is 
related to aggregate measures of happiness.  
Factors in both the source and destination country can affect the flow of people across countries, 
including differentials in income and income inequality, costs of migration (distance, language and cultural 
differences), immigration policy, stock of immigrants, political circumstances, macroeconomic conditions and 
demographic structure (Borjas 1987, 1989; Massey et al. 1993; Chiswick 2000; Hatton and Williamson 2005; and 
Clark, Hatton and Williamson 2007). The extent to which these and other factors affect the flow of people across 
countries depends on the time period and migration sample under study.   
Based on economic theory, migration decisions are made by comparing the utility of living in the home 
country with the utility of living abroad (Sjaastad 1962).  If the utility of living abroad exceeds the utility of 
staying home net of migration costs (which could include distance, language, family left home, etc.), the 
individual will move abroad, assuming immigration policy allows him to do so.    
Happiness, or the lack thereof, also affects utility.  Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006) show that happiness is 
correlated with other variables that are known to be correlated with true utility (such as unemployment); thus, 
happiness “captures something meaningful about utility” (p. 28).  In addition, other research on the subject of 
happiness has examined the relationship between aggregate measures of well-being and such things as income, 
income inequality, unemployment, inflation, government policy, and political situations.3  For example, a country 
with a developed democracy tends to have happier citizens than a country without a well-developed democracy 
(Frey and Stutzer 2000a, 2000b; Graham 2005).  Ruut Veenhoven, Professor of Human Happiness at Erasmus 
University, finds that many, but not all, happy countries are wealthy, democratic, tolerant, and well-governed 
(Stuart 2005).  Helliwell and Huang (2008) find that governmental quality, as measured by government 
effectiveness, regulatory quality, rule of law, and control of corruption, are closely linked to life satisfaction.   
                                                 
1 Hatton and Williamson (2005) have a nice discussion about how the pressures to limit migration have increased 
globally during this period, even though actual migrant flows have not decreased.   
2 http://www.un.org/esa/population/publications/2006Migration_Chart/Migration2006.pdf 
3 Frey and Stutzer (2002) and Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006) offer excellent reviews of this literature. 
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However, the relationship between income and happiness is more complicated.  Stevenson and Wolfers 
(2008) find a robust positive relationship between per capita GDP and average happiness across countries.  
However, many social scientists believe that standard measures of income do not capture the well-being or quality 
of life for individuals living in a given country (Layard 1980; Oswald 1997; Eckersley 2000; Frey and Stutzer 
2002; Di Tella, MacCulloch and Oswald 2003; Blanchflower and Oswald 2004a; Graham 2005).  They cite 
Easterlin’s (1974) paradox: increases in real GDP are not accompanied by increases in happiness.  In fact, income 
only seems to have a large impact on happiness up until the point that basic needs are satisfied.   Since the 1970s, 
incomes in the U.S. have been rising, but happiness has not (Graham 2005), and happiness for women in 
developed countries has actually been falling since the 1970s, even though women’s incomes have been rising 
with respect to men’s (Stevenson and Wolfers 2009).  These results may be driven by the fact that one’s place 
within the income distribution, rather than gross income, is important (Layard 1980; Easterlin 2003; Blanchflower 
and Oswald 2004a; Di Tella and MacCulloch 2006; Lee 2006).  Furthermore, income inequality within a nation 
has been shown to lower happiness levels (Alesina, Di Tella, and MacCulloch 2004).  
Migration decisions are based on utility; happiness is related to utility; but to date, no investigators have 
examined the relationship between migration and happiness.  The link between migration and happiness could 
work two ways.  First, it is possible that happiness affects migration such that people in unhappy countries are 
motivated to migrate to a happier country.  Similarly, people in happy countries may have less incentive to move 
abroad.  However, the reverse could be true: migration could affect happiness, so that the presence of immigrants 
may make people more or less happy in their country.  Both effects are plausible, but impossible to discern given 
available data.  As such, we focus on the correlation between happiness and migration, instead of the direction of 
causality.   
By understanding the happiness-migration relationship, we may then be able to isolate some of the driving 
forces behind migration, which has important policy implications.  Even the vast literature on the determinants of 
migration cannot fully explain migration trends.  We posit that perhaps the relative happiness of countries may 
explain why, for example, there are not larger migration flows between rich and poor countries, given the huge 
wage differentials.  In addition, our results may be informative for policymakers concerned about migration.  In 
developing countries that are relatively happy, policymakers could use happiness as a marketing tool to retain and 
attract high-skill workers, thereby reversing brain drain.  In addition, if potential migrants knew that citizens in 
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some of the popular migration destinations are relatively unhappy, that may discourage migration to those 
countries, which may be better for both the sending and receiving countries.         
In this paper, we assume happiness indices represent an accurate measure of aggregate well-being and 
determine if cross-country differences in happiness are associated with migrant flows.  We combine happiness data 
from the World Values Survey (WVS) with three migration datasets: emigration rates from the Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), immigration rates from the U.S. Census, and net migration rates 
from the United Nations (UN).  We examine whether happiness is significantly associated with migration, while 
controlling for other related variables such as income, income growth and time- and region-fixed effects.    
Using these data, our results suggest a U-shaped relationship between happiness and emigration rates: in 
very unhappy countries, emigration rates are quite high.  However, emigration rates fall in happier countries.  For 
very happy countries, the relationship between emigration rates and average happiness becomes positive.  This U-
shaped relationship between the happiness of the source country and the outflow of people is documented for two 
datasets of emigration.  We find the reverse relationship between happiness and net migration rates.  For relatively 
unhappy countries, higher levels of happiness correspond to higher net migration rates.  However, beyond a 
threshold level of happiness, net migration rates fall as happiness rises.    
I. Data 
 
We obtain data on happiness from the World Values Survey.4,5  The WVS asks the following question about 
happiness:   “Taking all things together, would you say you are: 1) very happy, 2) quite happy, 3) not very happy, or 
4) not at all happy.”  Following much of the literature and for ease of interpretation, we convert this unhappiness 
indicator to a happiness indicator, using the following formula: happiness = 5 - unhappiness.  The WVS interviewed 
between 1000 and 2000 people in each of the 84 countries between 1981 and 2004 in four waves (1981-1984, 1989-
1993, 1994-1999 and 1999-2004).  Using weights provided by the survey, we calculate a weighted average of the 
happiness indicator for each country-year available.6  Not all countries were sampled in each wave.  Furthermore, 
                                                 
4 http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/ 
5 The WVS also reports a life-satisfaction measure, but there is no clear pattern in the economics literature about the 
use of happiness indices compared to measures of life-satisfaction.  Life satisfaction is measured on a 10-point scale 
compared to the 4-point scale of the happiness index.  Not surprisingly, the two indices are highly correlated.  We 
report results using the happiness indices for ease of interpretation. However, results using the life satisfaction data 
are almost identical and can be obtained from the authors.  
6 Specifically, we computed weighted averages of each country-year cell using the ‘s018’ weight. Weights are 
defined at: http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/services/index.html.  
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many countries were not sampled the same number of times: the happiness indicator is available for one to five 
years in each country.  
The happiness data are individually self-reported, and, unlike most data used by economists (e.g., 
educational attainment, marital status), subjective. Any two people who seem outwardly similar, when ranking their 
own happiness, may differ in the way they determine a response.  Thus, interpersonal comparisons of happiness 
indices are difficult to interpret (Di Tella and MacCulloch 2006).  However, as the size of the group you are 
comparing increases, comparability increases due to a reduction in “systematic differential reporting biases” (Di 
Tella and MacCulloch 2006, p. 29).  Di Tella and MacCulloch (2006) add, “the underlying assumption …(in the 
economics literature) is that when people are measured in groups, the combination of their happiness scores reveals 
useful information with which to make comparisons about social welfare” (p. 32).  
Even though applying macro-level happiness indicators to explain social phenomena is not new, using 
subjective measures of happiness as a proxy for utility is still approached with skepticism by some scientists.  
Specifically, comparing subjective well-being measures across countries is complicated by differences in language 
and culture.  In addition, changes in well-being over time (within a country) may be associated with changes in 
objective factors.  However, several recent studies build credibility to the practice of comparing average well-being 
measures across countries and time, including Frey and Stutzer (2002), Layard (2005), Kahneman and Krueger 
(2006), Helliwell (2007) and Stevenson and Wolfers (2008, 2009). 
In Table 1, we list the average value of the happiness index for each country from the WVS and the number 
of years in which it was reported.  These values vary greatly among countries.  Colombia, Tanzania, El Salvador, 
Venezuela and Vietnam are some of the happiest countries in the world, even though none of them are among the 
richest countries.  Alternatively, high income countries, such as Italy, Greece and Portugal, are relatively unhappy.  
In general, however, wealthier countries are happier and poorer countries are less happy.  Many of the least happy 
countries in this sample are transition economies of Eastern Europe, including Latvia, Moldova, Bulgaria, Ukraine 
and Albania. 
We apply the happiness data from the WVS to three different migration datasets to determine the 
relationship between happiness and the flow of people across countries.  All three datasets include legal and illegal 
migrants.  First, we obtain emigration rates from the OECD for 176 countries around the year 2000, using the series 
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entitled “Emigration rates by country of birth of the total population.”7 The emigration rate from country of origin i 
is calculated by dividing the expatriate population from that country by the total native-born population of the same 
country, where the native-born population of country i is the sum of expatriates and resident native born of that 
country.  We multiply the emigration rate by 1000 to obtain the number of emigrants per 1000 people.8  The dates of 
the OECD data do not exactly match that of the happiness data.  For each country, we use the happiness index that 
was closest to the year reported in the OECD.  On average, there is a 1.7 year difference between the two.  When 
combining the WVS and OECD emigration data, we get a cross-section of 58 observations/countries.  The list of 
countries and summary statistics for each sample are reported in Table 2 and Table 3, respectively.  On average, 
48.85 people emigrate per 1000 people of the source country’s population for an average emigration rate of 4.885%, 
ranging from 1.63 per 1000 people in China to almost 280 per 1,000 in the Dominican Republic.  Average per capita 
GDP in 2000 is approximately $12,000, with the poorest country being Uganda and the richest country being 
Luxembourg.  The average GDP growth rate between 1995 and 1999 is 11%, and ranges from -7.5% in Venezuela 
to 58.7% in Iraq.9  Note that these are not annual growth rates, but instead reflect the growth rate for the 5-year 
period. Almost 40% of this sample consists of European countries while 26% are from Asia and 19% from Latin 
America.10         
The U.S. is one of the world’s largest destination countries with more than 38 million foreign-born people 
living there in 1995, representing almost 13% of the population.11  Using data from the U.S. Census (1980-2000) 
and the American Community Survey (ACS, 1999-2004), we tabulate the number of people who migrate to the U.S. 
each year between 1980 and 2004 from every country.  The immigration rate is found by dividing by the size of the 
source country’s population, using population data from the World Bank World Development Indicators (WDI).  
Again, we multiply immigration rates by 1000 to obtain the number of immigrants per 1,000 people.  When merging 
U.S. immigration rates with the WVS data, we get a panel of 175 observations that represents 76 source countries.  
In this case, we are able to match the years of the immigration and happiness data perfectly.  For some countries, we 
have several observations representing different years.  As reported in Table 1, Spain has the highest number of 
repeated observations, with five years.  However, many countries (27) have only one observation in the sample.       
                                                 
7 http://www.oecd.org/document/51/0,2340,en_2649_37415_34063091_1_1_1_37415,00.html 
8 We use this measure to be consistent across datasets. 
9 GDP data is not available for Iraq in 1995. Instead of dropping the observations, we used the 1997 GDP level to 
compute its growth rate. Thus, Iraq grew 58.7% between 1997 and 1999!  
10 Regions are classified using the UN groupings, http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=5. 
11 Source: United Nations Migration Report 1996 
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In the sample, the mean immigration rate to the U.S. is 0.44 people per 1000, as reported in column 2 of 
Table 3.  Puerto Rico sends the largest percent of their population to the U.S., with an U.S. immigration rate of 14 
people per 1000 (in 2001).  Per capita GDP averaged $9,224 (in 2000$) in the sample, while the average annual 
GDP growth rate was 2.5%.  The majority of the sample comes from Europe (59%).  More than 45% of the sample 
comes from the 1995-1999 period, while 24% and 20% represent the 1990-1994 and 2000-2004 periods, 
respectively.                
The last migration dataset we use comes from the United Nations World Population Prospects, the 2006 
Revision of the Population Database.12  We obtain net migration rates, which are calculated by taking the number of 
immigrants minus the number of emigrants over a period, divided by the person-years lived by the population of the 
receiving country over that period.  It is expressed as the net number of migrants per 1,000 people in each country, 
and the periods are 5-year intervals.  If emigrants exceed immigrants, net migration takes a negative value.  When 
merging with the WVS data, we get a panel of 163 observations from 80 countries.  As shown in column 3 of Table 
3, average net migration rates are close to 0, with 75 of the 163 observations having negative net migration rates.  
Albania in the 1995-1999 period experienced the largest net outflow of people, with a net migration rate of -18 
people per 1000.  Bosnia (in the same period) experienced the largest net inflow of people, with a net migration rate 
of 16 people per 1000.  The distributions of regions and time periods are similar to the immigration sample, with a 
majority of observations from Europe and 40% of observations from the late 1990s.            
In our analysis, we control for other factors that could potentially affect the relationship between migration 
and happiness, such as the level of GDP and its growth rate.  Per capita GDP in 2000 dollars is obtained from the 
WDI.  GDP growth rates are calculated using these data.      
To summarize, we merge happiness indicators from the WVS with three different migration datasets: (1) 
emigration rates from the OECD, (2) immigration rates into the U.S. from the U.S. Census and ACS, and (3) net 
migration rates from the UN.  Using all three datasets, we analyze the relationship between happiness and 
international migration, as described in the next section.  
   
 
 
                                                 
12 http://esa.un.org/unpp/index.asp?panel=2 
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II. The Models 
To examine the relationship between happiness and international migration, we estimate a standard 
empirical model of migration using Ordinary Least Squares for the three different datasets.  The model is quite 
similar in that the happiness indicator, GDP and GDP growth are used as independent variables, and time and 
regional fixed effects are considered.  However, the dependent variables are different in the three models. 
For the dependent variable in the first model, we use the emigration rate from country i around the year 
2000.  For the second equation, we use the U.S. immigration rate from country i in year t.  The dependent variable 
for the last specification is the net migration rate of country i during period t.  In the first two models, we examine 
the source country.  In the third model, we examine the destination country.  All of these variables represent the 
(legal and illegal) flow of people across borders.     
In addition to examining the relationship between happiness and migration, we include other variables in 
the models that are potentially correlated with migration.  The most likely candidate is income because it is often the 
primary motivation for many migration decisions (Hicks, 1932; Sjaastad 1962).  Rotte and Vogler (2000) argue the 
level of growth and development in source countries influences who has the largest incentive to migrate.  Several 
studies have documented a hump-shaped relationship between economic development and emigration (Massey 
1988; Hatton and Williamson 1998; Stalker 2000), where emigration rates rise in income for very poor countries, 
and fall in income for richer countries.  
Other than income, various other factors have been associated with international migration, including 
geography, cultural similarities, moving costs, demographics, social policies and immigration restrictions (Borjas 
1987, Borjas and Bratsberg 1996, Greenwood et al. 1999, Karemera, Oguledo and Davis 2000, Clark, Hatton and 
Williamson 2007). A recent paper by Mayda (2008) considers the role of source- and destination-country factors in 
affecting world-wide bilateral migrant flows; she finds that along with income in the destination country, 
immigration quotas, distance and demographics all pay important roles in determining international migrant flows.   
With these studies in mind, we examine other variables that could be related to immigration: income 
inequality, corruption, foreign domestic investment, trade volume, capital flows, political rights, rule of law, ethnic 
fractionalization, labor force participation, educational attainment, and life expectancy.13  We found that all of these 
variables are highly correlated with GDP and/or GDP growth and were ultimately dropped from the models.  In each 
                                                 
13 These data were obtained from Weil (2005) and the WDI. 
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specification, we include a set of region and period dummy variables to control for other factors that may affect the 
relationship between international migration and happiness.  As you will see in the results below, our main findings 
are robust to their inclusion.  The specification for each model is as follows. 
Model 1:  
Emigration ratei = β0 + β1 Happinessi + β2 Happinessi2 + β3 log(GDPi) +  β4 (log(GDPi))2 +  
β5 GDP growthi+ θRegion + εi            
where emigration rate is the number of emigrants from country i per 1000 people in country i around the year 2000; 
happiness is the happiness index for country i (the source country) around the year 2000; GDP is per capita real 
gross domestic product for country i in 2000; GDP growth is the growth rate in real GDP between 1995 and 1999 
for country i14; Region is a set of region dummy variables; and εi is an error term.  We do not include period fixed 
effects in this model because this sample represents a cross-section of countries at a point in time.   
Model 2:  
Immigration ratei,t = β0 + β1Happinessi,t + β2Happinessi,t2 + β3log(GDPi,t) + β4 (log(GDPi))2 +  
β5GDP growthi,t+  θRegion +  λ Period +  εi,t 
where the immigration rate is the number of U.S. immigrants per 1000 people from country i at time t; happiness 
and GDP are the same as above, but are specific to time t; GDP growth is the percent change in real GDP between 
years t-1 and t for country i; Region is a set of region dummy variables; Period is a set of period dummy variables, 
where periods represent five-year intervals (1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004); and εi,t is 
an error term.   
 It is important to note that all of the independent variables in Model 2 are specific to the source country 
(and not the destination country, the U.S.)  Thus, this model really captures the flow of people out of country i into 
the U.S. at time t.  Put differently, this is a model of emigration, and we should expect the results to be consistent 
with the findings of Model 1.15   
                                                 
14 We use a five year period in calculating GDP growth rates to represent the recent growth experience of the 
country.  The results are robust to using annual GDP growth rates.  
15 We considered turning Model 2 into a model of immigration, where the independent variables would be unique to 
the destination country (the U.S.)  But since the destination country is the same across the observations, we do not 
get enough variation in the variables to yield significant coefficient estimates.  We also considered a model where 
the independent variables are in relative terms (for example, relative happiness was defined as U.S. happiness 
divided by the source country happiness).  Once again, there was little variation in U.S. happiness over the time 
period.  Thus, we arrive at Model 2 that represents the flow of people out of country i and into the U.S. in each year 
as a fraction of country i’s population.     
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Model 3:  
Net migration ratei,t = β0 + β1Happinessi,t + β2Happinessi,t2 + β3log(GDPi,t) + β4GDP growthi,t  
+  θRegion +  λ Period +  εi,t 
where the net migration rate for country i at time t is the difference between the number of immigrants and the 
number of emigrants for country i over period t (which are five-year intervals), divided by the person-years lived by 
the population of country i over that period;  happiness and GDP are the same as above, but are specific to the 
destination country; GDP growth for destination country i is the percent change in real GDP between the first and 
last year of the relevant five-year period; Region and Period are the same as above; and εi,t is the error term.  Note 
that the happiness indices are matched to the 5-year intervals.  For example, if happiness is reported in 1997 for 
country i, it represents the happiness indicator for the 1995-1999 period for that country.  For periods in which more 
than one happiness indicator is available for a country, we average the relevant happiness indicators.  This happened 
for 18 of the 163 observations.  Note that the square of log(GDP) in not included in Model 3 because we believe that 
net migration is increasing in the destination country’s GDP: richer countries will attract more migrants, all else 
equal.16 
III. Results 
Model 1: 
The results for Model 1 are presented in Table 4.   Recall that the independent variable is the number of 
people who leave each country per 1000 people in the source country’s population.  In column A, we include only 
happiness of the source country and its square as the independent variables to isolate the relationship between 
happiness and migration.  Column B includes the natural log of per capita GDP (in 2000 $), its square and the 
growth rate in real GDP as control variables.  The last specification, in column C, controls for regional fixed effects 
in addition to the level and growth of GDP. 
Across all three specifications of Model 1, we find a significant, non-linear relationship between emigration 
and happiness of the source country.  In Figure 1, we plot the relationship using the estimated coefficients for the 
three specifications.  For relatively low levels of happiness, there is a negative relationship between happiness and 
                                                 
16 For all three models, various statistical models were considered, specifically, OLS models with log and square 
root transformations as well as generalized linear models with Gaussian and gamma families and multiple link 
functions. Using AIC as a model-selection criterion, none of these models were substantially better than the OLS 
model, and due to the ease of interpretation of the OLS model, it was chosen.  In fact, the predictions from all 
models considered gave similar results. 
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emigration: happier countries have lower emigration rates than less happy countries.  This makes sense: people in 
happier countries have less incentive to migrate.  However, beyond a threshold level of happiness, we find that the 
relationship between happiness and emigration becomes positive.  Thus, very happy countries have higher 
emigration rates, and the order of magnitude is significant.  In specification A, for example, a one standard deviation 
increase in the average happiness indicator (from 3 to 3.28) increases emigration by 13.5 people per 1000 (or, an 
1.35 percentage point increase in the emigration rate).  In the next section (section V), we discuss the reasons why 
people in very happy countries potentially think about migration differently than people in less happy countries.   
The U-shaped relationship between happiness and emigration is maintained when controlling for GDP and 
GDP growth (specification B) and other differences across regions (specification C).  Figure 1 illustrates that the 
threshold level of happiness in which the happiness-emigration relationship changes from negative to positive 
depends on GDP and GDP growth (compare specifications A and C in Figure 1).  When not controlling for income 
and income growth (specification A), the happiness-emigration relationship becomes positive for lower levels of 
happiness (at a  happiness index of 2.93 versus 2.97 in specification C, just below the ‘quite happy’ level).17  In 
addition, the inclusion of regional fixed effects changes the magnitude of the slope.  For example, the slope is flatter 
in specification C than specifications A and B for relatively happy countries.  That is, an increase in happiness leads 
to a smaller increase in emigration rates (for relatively happy countries) when unobserved differences in regions are 
considered.  It is important to note that while the happiness scale ranges from 1 to 4, no countries had an average 
happiness index below 2.        
In fact, as in previous studies (Massey 1988; Hatton and Williamson 1998; Stalker 2000), in specification B 
we find a hump-shaped relationship between emigration and GDP: the coefficient on log(GDP) is positive and 
significant, and the coefficient on the square of log(GDP) is negative and significant.  People from very poor nations 
are unlikely to migrate: they lack the financial means to move.  As incomes increase, migration becomes possible as 
they gain the resources needed, and they may also be more informed about opportunities outside of their own 
country.  These effects may dominate the rising level of income at home relative to abroad.  Thus, the hump-shaped 
relationship between emigration rates and income exists, even when controlling for the differences in happiness 
across countries.     
                                                 
17 We calculate the inflection point by differentiating the estimated models. h* is based on the estimated coefficients 
for the happiness indicator (β1) and its square (β2), holding all other variables constant. That is, h*=-β1/2β2.  
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However, once we control for regional effects (in specification C), log(GDP) and its square are no longer 
significant predictors of emigration.  This is true because log(GDP) is correlated with most of the regional dummy 
variables (e.g., Europe (r=0.505), Africa (r=-0.413), and Asia (r=-0.393).  This demonstrates the disconnect between 
happiness and GDP: although European countries are, in general, wealthy, and African countries are, in general, 
poor, European countries are not universally happy, and African countries are not universally unhappy.  More 
important is the country’s recent growth experience: GDP growth is positively related to emigration rates, and this is 
robust to the inclusion of regional fixed effects.  In specification C, a one percentage point increase in GDP growth 
increases the emigration rate by approximately 157 people per 1000 (15.7 percentage points).  Thus, countries that 
recently went through an expansionary period experience a significant increase in emigration rates, holding GDP 
and happiness constant.  Perhaps the macroeconomic expansion is a migration catalyst, providing potential migrants 
the additional resources necessary to fund their migration.  
Most importantly, the significant, U-shaped relationship between happiness and emigration remains, even 
with the inclusion of GDP, GDP growth and regional fixed effects.  Thus, the overall level of happiness in the 
destination country is important to consider when analyzing the various determinants of international migration.    
We also considered other control variables, including Gini coefficients, rule of law, corruption and capital 
flows, and experimented with lags of happiness, GDP and GDP growth.  Many of these variables were highly 
correlated with GDP and/or GDP growth, and were thus excluded from the final analysis.  However, even when 
these variables were included in the regression (either in addition to GDP and GDP growth or as a substitute for 
them), we found that the relationship between happiness and emigration is robust.  While the magnitudes of the 
coefficients changed a bit, their direction and significance did not.  Thus, we feel confident that our model 
accurately depicts this relationship.    
Model 2: 
Next, we apply U.S. Census and American Community Survey data to our model.  The data consist of an 
unbalanced panel of 76 countries between 1981 and 2003 for a total of 175 observations.  The dependent variable of 
Model 2 is the number of U.S. immigrants from country i that entered in year t relative to the population of country 
i.  Since the happiness index (on the right-hand side of the regression) is for the source country, this is a model of 
emigration, just like Model 1, but with different data.  That is, we now examine if U.S. immigrants come from 
relatively happy or unhappy countries.  Thus, this model represents immigration into the U.S. only (and not 
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worldwide migration, as in Model 1).  In addition, the sample size is much larger since it is a time series.  However, 
the control variables and their functional form are the same as in Model 1.  Also, as in Model 1, we report three 
model specifications.  All specifications are the same as Model 1, except that in this case, Specification C contains 
time-period indicator variables.     
The results are shown in Table 5 and are similar to those from Model 1.  There is a U-shaped relationship 
between happiness of the source country and the flow of people into the U.S.   That is, up to a threshold level of 
happiness, happier countries send fewer migrants to the U.S.  After that threshold, immigration to the U.S. increases 
with happiness.  The findings are robust to the inclusion of GDP, GDP growth, and region- and period-dummy 
variables.  Figure 2 shows that the threshold level of happiness in which the happiness-migration relationship 
changes is very similar across all three specifications: ranging from 2.80 in specification A to 2.91 in specification 
C.   
Notice that the coefficients on happiness and its square are smaller in magnitude than the results from 
Model 1.  This is because we are only considering emigration to the U.S., not total emigration. The results indicate 
that for countries with happiness indices at 3, a one standard deviation increase in the happiness index will increase 
the flow of migrants to the U.S. by 0.41 people per 1000 (or, 0.041 percentage points), based on the results from 
specification C.  Thus, it seems that differences in happiness indices in source countries of U.S. immigrants have a 
small, yet significant, effect on the flow of people into the U.S.   
In Model 2 we find the same hump-shaped relationship between log(GDP) and immigration to the U.S. as 
we did with log(GDP) and worldwide emigration in Model 1, and these variables are significant at the 10% level in 
specification B.  However, the addition of regional variables in specification C causes these variables to become 
insignificant.  As in Model 1, we find some evidence that GDP growth in the source country is positively associated 
with immigration to the U.S.  A one percentage point increase in GDP growth (between the current and past year) is 
associated with a 6.05 percentage point increase in immigration to the U.S. (specification B).18  Once we consider 
region and period fixed effects (in specification C), GDP growth loses its significance (which did not happen in 
Model 1).  Of all of the region and period fixed effects, only the coefficient on Latin America is significant (at the 
5% level).     
                                                 
18 Note that we also consider past GDP growth. The results are similar to those presented.  Ideally, we would use 
GDP in the previous five years to be consistent with the other models, but in doing so we lose 8 observations. Again, 
the results are very similar.  
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These results confirm our findings from Model 1.  We document a U-shaped relationship between 
happiness and the flow of people out of countries.  This is true even though the first model pertains to the worldwide 
flow of people from 58 different countries around the year 2000 in response to changes in the source country’s 
average level of happiness, while the second model pertains to the flow of people from 76 countries and into the 
U.S. between 1981 and 2003.  The U-shaped relationship between happiness and emigration rates is robust to the 
inclusion of other macroeconomic variables, region and period fixed effects, and lags in happiness, GDP and GDP 
growth.19      
Model 3: 
 Lastly, we apply the model to net migration.  Using data from the UN, we collect net migration rates for 80 
countries between 1980 and 2004, and merge it with happiness data from the WVS.  Net migration rates are defined 
as the difference between immigrants and emigrants in country i divided by the person-years lived by the population 
of country i.  The UN reports net migration rates in five-year intervals.  In this model, it is important to recognize 
that all of the independent variables, including the happiness indicator, represent the destination country, which is 
different from Models 1 and 2, where they represent source countries.     
   The results of Model 3 are presented in Table 6, and specifications A, B, and C are the same as in Model 2.  
We find a hump-shaped relationship between net migration and happiness in the destination country, as illustrated in 
Figure 3.  For relatively unhappy countries, net migration rates increase with happiness.  That is, immigrants exceed 
emigrants in happier countries.  Beyond a threshold level of happiness (approximately 3.15 in specifications B and 
C), happier countries experience decreases in net migration rates.  Specifically, a one standard deviation increase in 
the happiness index (from 3.15) decreases net migration by approximately 1.11 people per 1000 in specification C 
(or, 0.111 percentage points).  Thus, more people are leaving happier countries than are entering during that period, 
and this relationship is robust to the inclusion of regional dummy variables and period fixed effects.         
 Once again, the results are maintained across all three specifications.  In this model, we find more support 
of GDP and GDP growth as important determinants of net migration.  Specifications B and C both deliver 
significant, positive coefficients for the natural logarithm of GDP and the GDP growth rate.  In this case, higher 
income in the destination country is attracting migrants: net migration rates are higher in richer countries.  In 
addition, countries that experience more GDP growth have higher emigration rates.  Since GDP growth in this 
                                                 
19 The set of control variables considered is smaller than in Model 1 because we do not have time series data on 
variables such as Gini coefficients, corruption, rule of law, etc.   
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model represents the amount of growth during the current period (compared to the past period, as in Model 1), this 
result may indicate that destination countries grow faster as a result of the new migrants.  Our results indicate that 
this may be the case, and if so, the effect is economically significant: a one percentage point increase in GDP growth 
in the period is associated with a 4.7 percentage point increase in emigration rates.   
Specification C of Model 3 delivers a few significant region and time dummy variables: two of the five 
region dummy variables are significant (Asia and Latin America), as is one of the period dummy variables (1980-
1984 period).  Thus, unobserved differences between some regions and time periods cause at least some of the 
differences in emigration rates.     
The goodness of fit in Model 3 is much better than in Models 1 and 2, as indicated by the relatively high R2 
in all three specifications.  Thus, our set of control variables (namely, happiness indices and development indicators) 
are better predictors of net migration rates than emigration rates (from Model 1 and Model 2).           
The results from this model are consistent with our findings from Models 2 and 3; since net migration 
reflects the difference between immigration and emigration, a positive emigration rate would lead to a negative net 
migration rate, all else equal.  Where these models differ is in terms of the marginal effect of happiness: emigration 
rates respond the most to changes in average happiness, given by the large estimated coefficients in Table 4.  The 
smallest effects are found in migration rates to the U.S.  In all cases, however, the happiness-migration relationship 
is economically significant.     
Our results show that the relationship between migration and happiness in nonlinear.  Also, the threshold 
level of happiness in which the relationship between happiness and migration changes is quite similar in all three 
datasets: 2.91 (immigration), 2.97 (emigration), and 3.15 (net migration), all close to the ‘quite happy’ level.20  
This indicates some consistency in the level of happiness at which the happiness-migration relationship changes 
across all three datasets.  
IV. Possible Explanations 
All of our results point to a nonlinear relationship between happiness and migration.  Generally speaking, 
for countries that are at least ‘quite happy’ (happiness>3), happier countries have higher (lower) emigration (net 
migration) rates.  The reverse is true for countries that are ‘not very happy’ or ‘not at all happy’ on average 
                                                 
20 These thresholds are calculated for specification C in all three cases.  
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(happiness<3): happier countries have lower (higher) emigration (net migration) rates.  Our results hold up to 
various empirical specifications, datasets and control variables.   
A priori, we expected the negative relationship between happiness and emigration rates: one would think 
that people in happier countries are less willing to migrate (controlling for differences in income and income 
growth).  Those at the bottom of the happiness spectrum may be simply trying to improve their lives, so higher 
levels of happiness at home push fewer people out of the country.  Similarly, destination countries that are happier 
would attract more people from abroad, pushing up net migration rates in those countries.   
However, in both cases, the happiest of countries experience a different phenomenon: emigration rates 
increase with the source country’s happiness and net migration rates increase in the happiness of the destination 
country.  So, why does the happiness-migration relationship change over the spectrum of happiness indices?  
One explanation is that migrants from happy countries are more optimistic than people in less happy 
countries.  We think happiness reflects optimism, so that people in happier countries are more optimistic about life 
in general and the possibilities that exist outside of their country and are more willing to move to take advantage of 
better opportunities abroad.  Thus, migrants tend to be optimistic.  This is supported by Ek et al. (2008): people who 
migrated (from rural to urban areas in Finland) were more optimistic in general than those who had not migrated.21  
In addition, migrants were more likely to be very satisfied with their life than non-migrants.  Of course, there is no 
way to measure optimism in our dataset, but our findings suggest that there is something inherently different 
between unhappy and happy countries when it comes to their attitudes on migration.  This may be important in 
managing world-wide migration flows.  If the citizens of certain countries are more optimistic in general, that could 
explain high rates of emigration.  If emigration is a concern (as in the case of brain drain), policies could be designed 
to keep them home, knowing that they are optimistic about outside opportunities.  If countries want to promote 
emigration (as a means of controlling population or influencing remittances from rich countries), policies could be 
set to channel the inherent optimism of migrants.      
Another possible explanation comes from prospect theory, originated by Kahneman and Tversky (1979.  
Prospect theory suggests that choices are based on relative improvements in one’s position rather than the final 
outcome.  Recently, prospect theory has been used by Vendrik and Woltjer (2007) to analyze the relationship 
between life satisfaction and income.  In the context of happiness and migration, people in happier countries may 
                                                 
21 In their study, the life orientation test was used to measure optimistic versus pessimistic attitude towards the 
future.  
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view migration differently than people in less happy countries since a certain level of happiness is already attained.  
For example, in relatively happy countries, an increase in happiness may be associated with higher emigration rates 
since the possibility of achieving a higher level of happiness abroad may influence migration; people in this category 
may be willing to tolerate more risk and hence migrate.  However, in relatively unhappy countries, an increase in 
happiness improves the situation in their home country and thereby lowers emigration rates; these people may be 
more risk adverse with respect to migration.  The difference in the reference points between the two groups distorts 
the decision to migrate, consistent with prospect theory.            
We find a link between happiness and migration, but we are not able to isolate exactly which factors are 
making people happy (or unhappy) and influence them to migrate.  However, the large literature on the determinants 
of happiness helps in this regard.  As mentioned before, macroeconomic variables such as unemployment, inflation, 
government policy, and political situations affect the aggregate well-being of a society, which may in turn influence 
migration.  At the micro level, as documented by Blanchflower and Oswald (2004b), individual characteristics such 
as gender, marital status, race, age, educational attainment, etc. influence the well-being of a person, and may be 
associated with migration.  In future work, we will use the micro-level happiness data from the WVS to determine 
the factors associated with individual level happiness. We will then be able to determine if these factors are 
associated with aggregate migration flows (recall that detailed migration histories are not available in these data).        
V. Conclusions 
 
In this paper, we study the relationship between the aggregate well-being of a country, as measured by the 
average happiness of its citizens, and the flow of people across countries.  A priori, one might expect the average 
happiness of a society to motivate people to leave a country and/or attract people to a particular country.  In fact, we 
find evidence of two forces at work.  Happiness has a U-shaped association with emigration: people from very 
happy countries are likely to emigrate, as are people from very unhappy countries.  However, people from countries 
in the middle of the happiness distribution are less likely to emigrate.  This relationship is robust to three different 
migration datasets and controlling for differences in development indicators and regional and period fixed effects.  
This study represents the first step in analyzing the complex relationship between happiness and worldwide 
migrant flows, and we realize that there are limitations to our approach.  First, movement between countries is not 
completely free: many countries give preferential treatment to specific other countries.  If freedom of movement is 
not uniformly distributed among happy and unhappy countries, this may bias our results.  For example, unhappy 
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countries may be unhappy partially due to their lack of freedom.  In this case, if free movement were allowed, the 
effects on emigration may be much more substantial on the lower end of the happiness scale.  
Second, we use aggregate data; every society, happy or not, has unhappy citizens, and it might be the most 
unhappy people from each country who choose to emigrate.  Alternatively, if happiness reflects optimism, it might 
be the happiest citizens who move abroad.   How these immigrants compare to the non-foreign born citizens of a 
destination country may also be an interesting feature to analyze, and may spur debate for the ongoing immigration 
policy discussions in most of the advanced countries of the world.  Unfortunately, very little micro-level data 
currently exists that reports both happiness levels and cross-country migration history. While there is a small subset 
of people in the WVS that live in a country different from their birth country (5.5% of the sample); however, only 
their region of birth is reported (i.e., not their country) and their specific year of entry is not reported, making us 
unable to generate migration histories for these individuals in the dataset.   
 Given these limitations, our next step is to attach country-specific migration rates to individual-level 
happiness data.  Alternatively, because those at the bottom of the income distribution in any particular country also 
tend to be the least happy (Stevenson and Wolfers 2008), we will use individual-level migrant data to determine if 
migrants from happy countries are more-, less- or equally likely to be from the bottom of the income distribution in 
their home country than immigrants form unhappy countries.  These, along with several other projects, will be 
addressed in future work.      
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Table 1 Ranking of Countries by Happiness, World Values Survey Sample, 1981-2004 
Country Average happiness 
Number of 
years  Country 
Average 
happiness 
Number of 
years  
Colombia 3.65 1 Israel 3.02 1 
Tanzania 3.50 1 Uganda 3.01 1 
El Salvador 3.47 1 Uruguay 3.00 1 
Venezuela 3.45 2 Brazil 2.99 2 
Vietnam 3.41 1 Pakistan 2.98 2 
Puerto Rico 3.40 2 Germany 2.98 3 
Iceland 3.40 3 India 2.97 3 
Ireland 3.37 3 East Germany 2.97 1 
Netherlands 3.37 3 Algeria 2.96 1 
Saudi Arabia 3.35 1 Bangladesh 2.96 2 
Denmark 3.34 3 China 2.96 3 
N. Ireland 3.34 3 Bosnia/Herz 2.95 2 
Australia 3.34 2 Italy 2.94 3 
Switzerland 3.32 2 Korea 2.94 3 
Sweden 3.31 4 Peru 2.93 2 
United States 3.31 4 Jordan 2.91 1 
Singapore 3.30 1 Greece 2.91 1 
Belgium 3.30 3 Portugal 2.91 2 
Philippines 3.29 2 Azerbaijan 2.88 1 
Luxembourg 3.28 1 Poland 2.86 4 
Nigeria 3.28 3 Czech Republic 2.86 4 
New Zealand 3.28 1 Croatia 2.85 2 
UK 3.26 3 Hungary 2.82 4 
Canada 3.26 3 Macedonia  2.81 2 
Austria 3.23 2 Iran 2.81 1 
Norway 3.22 3 Serbia  2.80 2 
Taiwan  3.19 1 Slovenia 2.80 3 
France 3.17 3 Georgia 2.72 1 
Indonesia 3.15 1 Zimbabwe 2.67 1 
Finland 3.13 3 Iraq 2.66 1 
Malta 3.12 3 Slovakia 2.65 4 
Mexico 3.12 3 Estonia 2.65 3 
Turkey 3.12 3 Lithuania 2.63 3 
South Africa 3.11 3 Armenia 2.55 1 
Japan 3.10 4 Romania 2.52 3 
Chile 3.09 3 Belarus 2.52 3 
Egypt 3.06 1 Russia  2.49 3 
Argentina 3.06 4 Latvia 2.46 3 
Dom. Republic 3.05 1 Moldova 2.46 2 
Kirghizstan 3.04 1 Bulgaria 2.45 3 
Spain 3.04 5 Ukraine 2.44 2 
Morocco 3.04 1 Albania 2.43 2 
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Table 2 List of Countries in Samples  
Emigration Sample (58): Albania, Argentina, Australia, Bangladesh, Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, 
China, Colombia, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Morocco, 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Romania, 
Saudi Arabia, Singapore, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Uganda, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, 
Venezuela, Vietnam, Zimbabwe 
Immigration Sample (76): Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Belgium, Bosnia, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominican 
Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Macedonia, Malta, Mexico, Moldavia, 
Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, 
Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, South Korea, Spain, Sweden, 
Switzerland, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zimbabwe 
Net Migration Sample (80): Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bangladesh, 
Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia & Herzegovina, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, Chile, China, Colombia, Croatia, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Dominican Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, 
Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, 
Luxembourg, Malta, Mexico, Moldova, Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, 
Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Puerto Rico, Korea, Romania, Russia, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Singapore, Slovakia, 
Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Macedonia, Turkey, Uganda, Ukraine, United Kingdom, 
Tanzania, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Vietnam, Zimbabwe 
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Table 3 Summary Statistics for all Three Samples 
  Emigration  Immigration Net Migration 
Variable Mean SD Mean SD Mean SD 
Migrants per 1000 48.85 62.21 0.44 1.76 -0.02 4.50 
Happiness 3.11 0.28 3.01 0.29 3.03 0.28 
Per capita GDP in 2000 $ $12,016 $12,262 $9,224 $9,445 $9,581a $9,699 
GDP growth 11.0%b 11.2% 2.5% 4.7% 7.94%c 19.56% 
Africa 8.6% 28.3% 6.5% 24.8% 7.4% 26.2% 
Asia 25.9% 44.2% 17.9% 38.4% 20.2% 40.3% 
Europe 39.7% 49.3% 58.9% 49.3% 54.0% 50.0% 
Latin America 19.0% 39.5% 13.1% 33.8% 12.3% 32.9% 
North America 3.4% 18.4% 1.8% 13.3% 3.7% 18.9% 
Oceania 3.4% 18.4% 1.8% 13.3% 2.5% 15.5% 
1980-1984 Period -- -- 8.9% 28.6% 11.0% 31.4% 
1985-1989 Period -- -- 1.2% 10.9% 0.6% 7.8% 
1990-1994 Period -- -- 23.8% 42.7% 25.8% 43.9% 
1995-1999 Period -- -- 45.8% 50.0% 39.9% 49.1% 
2000-2004 Period -- -- 20.2% 40.3% 22.7% 42.0% 
Number of Countries 58   76  80  
Observations 58   175   163   
aPer capita GDP at beginning of 5-year period (in 2000 $) 
bGDP growth between 1995-1999 
cGDP growth in 5-year period 
Note: The emigration sample is for the year 2000; period dummy variables are not applicable. 
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Table 4 Regression Results for Model 1: Emigration  
Specification C
Emigrants per 1000 Coeff Std Error t-statistic Coeff Std Error t-statistic Coeff Std Error t-statistic
Constant 1385.99 647.43 2.14 790.00 679.49 1.16 981.78 750.36 1.31
Happiness -924.54** 434.92 -2.13 -976.34** 406.88 -2.40 -830.09* 441.71 -1.88
Happiness^2 157.79** 72.67 2.17 165.50** 67.86 2.44 139.87* 72.97 1.92
Log(GDP) -- -- -- 155.03** 70.11 2.21 61.84 85.52 0.72
Log(GDP)^2 -- -- -- -8.77** 4.22 -2.08 -3.41 5.17 -0.66
GDP Growth -- -- -- 154.27** 68.62 2.25 157.48 68.86 2.29
Africa -- -- -- -- -- -- -23.75 53.46 -0.44
Asia -- -- -- -- -- -- -27.90 46.08 -0.61
Europe -- -- -- -- -- -- 3.95 42.60 0.09
Latin America -- -- -- -- -- -- 25.83 45.29 0.57
North America -- -- -- -- -- -- -46.50 57.22 -0.81
Adjusted R^2 0.0515 0.1755 0.1825
Countries 58 58 58
Observations 58 58 58
Specification A Specification B
 
* (**)  denotes significance at the 10% (5%) level 
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Table 5 Regression Results for Model 2: Immigration 
Specification C
Immigrants per 1000 Coeff Std Error t-statistic Coeff Std Error t-statistic Coeff Std Error t-statistic
Constant 24.20 11.98 2.02 20.68 12.56 1.65 27.11 12.96 2.09
Happiness -17.18** 8.14 -2.11 -21.51** 8.27 -2.60 -18.43** 8.66 -2.13
Happiness^2 3.06** 1.37 2.22 3.80** 1.39 2.73 3.17** 1.45 2.19
Log(GDP) -- -- -- 2.44* 1.27 1.92 -0.18 1.42 -0.13
Log(GDP)^2 -- -- -- -0.15* 0.08 -1.92 0.01 0.09 0.13
GDP Growth -- -- -- 6.05** 3.04 1.99 5.03 3.13 1.61
Africa -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.05 1.17 -0.04
Asia -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.13 1.08 0.12
Europe -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.52 1.00 0.52
Latin America -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.07** 1.05 1.97
North America -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.22 1.38 0.16
1980-1984 Period -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.32 0.55 -0.59
1985-1989 Period -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.08 1.25 -0.07
1990-1994 Period -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.42 0.43 -0.99
1995-1999 Period -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.19 0.38 -0.49
Adjusted R^2 0.0377 0.0602 0.4145
Countries 76 76 76
Observations 175 175 175
Specification A Specification B
* (**)  denotes significance at the 10% (5%) level 
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Table 6 Regression Results for Model 3: Net Migration  
Specification C
Net Migrants Coeff Std Error t-statistic Coeff Std Error t-statistic Coeff Std Error t-statistic
Constant -143.32 28.00 5.12 -122.14 26.79 4.56 -141.11 28.47 4.96
Happiness 90.16** 19.01 4.74 72.34** 18.27 3.96 88.07** 19.54 4.51
Happiness^2 -14.03** 3.21 -4.37 -11.48** 3.07 -3.74 -13.99** 3.24 -4.32
Log(GDP) -- -- -- 1.05** 0.23 4.67 0.82** 0.31 2.66
GDP Growth -- -- -- 4.52** 1.51 3.00 4.70** 1.58 2.96
Africa -- -- -- -- -- -- -2.34 2.18 -1.07
Asia -- -- -- -- -- -- -4.02** 1.93 -2.09
Europe -- -- -- -- -- -- -2.40 1.79 -1.34
Latin America -- -- -- -- -- -- -4.89** 1.92 -2.54
North America -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.43 2.24 -0.19
1980-1984 Period -- -- -- -- -- -- -2.08* 1.11 -1.86
1985-1989 Period -- -- -- -- -- -- 2.64 3.55 0.74
1990-1994 Period -- -- -- -- -- -- 0.08 0.88 0.09
1995-1999 Period -- -- -- -- -- -- -0.84 0.80 -1.05
Adjusted R^2 0.2784 0.3713 0.4145
Countries 80 80 80
Observations 163 163 163
Specification A Specification B
 
* (**)  denotes significance at the 10% (5%) level 
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Fig. 1 Predicted Relationship between Happiness and Emigration 
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Fig. 2 Predicted Relationship between Happiness and Immigration 
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Fig. 3 Predicted Relationship between Happiness and Net Migration 
 
